Looking Ahead: October Term 2006 by Rutledge, Peter B.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2005
Looking Ahead: October Term 2006
Peter Rutledge
Dean & Herman E. Talmadge Chair of Law
University of Georgia Law School, borut@uga.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Peter B. Rutledge, Looking Ahead: October Term 2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 361 (2005),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1261
Looking Ahead: October Term 2006
Peter B. Rutledge*
October Term 2006 will be the first full opportunity for Court-
watchers to assess the impact of recent changes in the Court's mem-
bership. It will be Chief Justice Roberts' second full term and Justice
Alito's first. It also will provide the first full term in which to assess
whether Justice Kennedy will reclaim his role as "swing justice."
Accompanying these changes in the Court's personnel will be a
docket full of interesting cases on topics such as the constitutionality
of racial diversity programs, abortion, environmental law, punitive
damages, and criminal procedure.
Consistent with prior contributions to this series, this essay offers
readers a critical overview of what to expect during October Term
2006 at the U.S. Supreme Court. Given the potentially important
shifts in the Court's personnel and the consequences of those shifts
for the Court's voting blocs, the essay first analyzes the general effect
of these shifts in membership, especially the impact of Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito as well as the increased importance of
Justice Kennedy. The second portion of the essay examines the major
cases on the Court's docket for October Term 2006 and places them
in context of these changes in the Court's membership.
I. Changing Personnel and the New Voting Dynamics
This part of the essay addresses the impact of changes in the
Court's personnel. It considers the impact of Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Alito, and Justice Kennedy.
*Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of
America. I would like to thank the Cato Institute, especially Mark Moller, for the
invitation to submit this essay. Veryl Miles, Dean of the Law School, provided gener-
ous financial support for my research this summer. Maureen Smith and Barney Ford,
both students at the Law School, provided excellent research assistance. Steve Young,
a reference librarian at the Law School, helped to track down materials on the Supreme
Court. Julie Kendrick, an assistant at the Law School, helped with the production of
the manuscript (including suffering through my chicken scratches on the first draft).
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A. Chief Justice Roberts
The impact of Chief Justice Roberts is two fold: his impact as chief
and his impact as a justice. The chief justice has often been described
as the first among equals.1 That is, with respect to the bread-and-
butter work of the Court, he possesses certain institutional preroga-
tives, mostly by tradition.2 Otherwise, he has no more power to
influence an outcome than any other justice. This is especially true
when he is in the minority, whether on a certiorari petition, a stay
application, or a decision of the Court. In three respects, though,
Chief Justice Roberts has had or has the potential to have an impact
on the Court in his capacity as chief justice.
First, Chief Justice Roberts has, to a point, achieved a greater
degree of consensus on the Court. During his confirmation hearings,
Chief Justice Roberts expressed his desire to achieve greater judicial
consensus, which was a matter of particular importance at the time
in light of recent splintered decisions at the Court such as the Ten
Commandments cases. As part of this desire to achieve consensus,
'Denis Steven Rutkus & Lorraine H. Tong, Congressional Research Service, The
Chief Justice of the United States: Responsibilities of the Office and Process for
Appointment, at Summary-1 (CRS Report for Congress RL 32821) (September 12,
2005).
20n the statutory responsibilities of the chief justice, see id. at CRS-4-CRS-7.
'A fourth deserves brief mention but does not warrant full treatment. Some accounts
suggest that the chief justice also has influenced the dynamics of the justices' confer-
ences, where they discuss certiorari petitions and their votes on cases. Whereas Chief
Justice Rehnquist allegedly ran those conferences on a fairly tight schedule, Chief
Justice Roberts allegedly has loosened those restrictions and, thereby, occasioned
greater debate among the justices. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, In the Roberts Court,
More Room for Argument, N.Y. Times, May 3, 2006, at A19; Linda Greenhouse, New
Leaders, Tough Issues for Court in Transition, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al. The
justices' conferences remain entirely private, so, until a justice retires and makes his
papers publicly available, these speculations are extremely hard to verify through
objective means.
'Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 371 (2005),
available at 2006 WL 86787 (F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter Transcript of Roberts Confirmation
Hearings] ("Well, if I am confirmed, I think one of the things that the Chief Justice
should have as a top priority is to try to bring about a greater degree of coherence
and consensus in the opinions of the Court.... I think the Court should be as united
behind an opinion of the Court as it possibly can."); id. at 303 ("I do think, though,
it's a responsibility of all the Justices, not just the Chief Justice, to try to work toward
an opinion of the Court .. . . I do think the Chief Justice has a particular obligation
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Chief Justice Roberts has commented favorably on the subject of
judicial minimalism, famously quipping at Georgetown University's
Law School this year: "If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose
of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide more." In
several respects, Chief Justice Roberts already has succeeded in his
efforts at consensus building. In October Term 2005, the Court
decided nearly fifty percent on its docket without dissent, a signifi-
cant uptick over recent terms.' This past term, the Court decided
sixteen cases by five-vote majorities, far fewer than in its most recent
terms. Of all the justices who sat during the entire term, Chief Justice
Roberts was most often in the majority-both across all cases and in
split decisions. Notably, some of these consensus decisions included
areas where Court watchers had predicted pitched battles. The Court
handed down unanimous decisions in cases involving the constitu-
tionality of the Solomon Amendment, New Hampshire's abortion
law, restrictions on abortion protests, standing in dormant Com-
merce Clause cases, the death penalty, and religious freedom.
Of course, the chief justice's efforts at building consensus did not
always succeed. Indeed, given the controversial nature of many
cases on the Court's docket, it is hardly surprising that, so long as
to try to achieve consensus consistent with everyone's oath to uphold the Constitution,
and that would certainly be a priority for me if I were confirmed.").
'Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist, L.A. Times, May 25, 2006, at B11, available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/sunstein-minimalism-roberts.html (last visited July
30, 2006).
6Rebecca Cady, Georgetown University Law Center Supreme Court Institute,
Supreme Court of the United States: October Term 2005 Overview 1 (June 30, 2006)
[hereinafter Georgetown Overview]. Any statistical account of activity at the Supreme
Court must make certain methodological assumptions such as how to count consoli-
dated cases, how to treat per curiam opinions, and how to treat partially joined
opinions for purposes of determining voting affinities. While several sources exist,
this essay utilizes the statistics of (and the methodological assumptions contained




9See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct.
1297 (2006); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006);
Scheidler v. N.O.W., Inc. 126 S. Ct. 1264 (2006); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126
S. Ct. 1854 (2006); Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006); and Gonzales v. 0
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
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the Supreme Court permits separate opinions, justices will continue
to write them. In several cases, in areas such as environmental law,
voting rights, and campaign finance, the Court was unable to achieve
a majority. Perhaps the most extreme disappointment in this regard
was the Texas redistricting case, where one virtually needs an
instructional manual to understand the holding:
Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-A and
III, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined,
an opinion with respect to Parts I and IV, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Alito, J., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts
II-B and II-C, and an opinion with respect to Part II-D, in
which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which
Breyer, J., joined as to Parts I and II. Souter, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg,
J., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Roberts, C. J., filed an opinion concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting
in part, in which Alito, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part,
in which Thomas, J., joined, and in which Roberts, C. J., and
Alito, J., joined as to Part III.n
In the coming term, watch for Chief Justice Roberts to continue
to strive for consensus-or at least greater clarity-in the Court's
decisions.
Second, watch also how the chief justice assigns opinions. In some
potentially controversial cases, he assigned the opinion to himself
and achieved either a unanimous opinion or unanimity in judgment,
suggesting that he has sought to use the opinion assignment process
to build consensus.12 Yet not all his opinion assignments seem geared
to consensus. In some, rather than assigning the opinion to a "swing"
justice, who might be inclined to resolve the case on narrower, more
10See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) [hereinafter LULAC]; and Randall
v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
11LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2604.
12 See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006); Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006); and DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
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minimalist grounds, he has instead assigned the opinion to a justice
who was bound to write a far broader opinion. The starkest example
from the past term was Hudson v. Michigan,13 where the Court held
that the exclusionary rule did not apply to violations of the Fourth
Amendment's knock-and-announce requirement. Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court rested on broad reasoning that is not easily
confined to the knock-and-announce context (and could therefore
foreshadow a broader scaling back of the exclusionary rule).
Third, watch the size of the docket. During the Rehnquist Court,
the size of the Court's argument docket shrunk.'" At his confirmation
hearings, Chief Justice Roberts indicated that he believed the Court
could increase the size of its docket. 6 This past term did not mark
a significant shift in the docket size, and the Court only decided
seventy-five cases after argument, consistent with the relatively
small docket in recent years." Of course, in two respects, it is difficult
to attribute that statistic to Chief Justice Roberts-a portion of the
docket had been set before he became chief justice and, at conference,
he only has a single vote whereas certiorari requires four.'" Perhaps
more tellingly, though, the Court only has twenty-nine cases on its
docket for October Term 2006, far fewer than have been on its docket
at comparable points in prior years." Until a justice's vote sheets
are released in the national archives decades from now, we can only
speculate why this might be the case: perhaps cert-worthy cases are
not reaching the Court; perhaps Chief Justice Roberts is having
difficulty persuading his brethren of the desirability of taking more
cases; or perhaps the chief justice himself is having second thoughts
13126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
14 See, e.g., id. at 2165.
"See David M. O'Brien, A Diminished Plenary Docket, 89 Judicature 134 (Nov.-
Dec. 2005), available at http://www.ajs.org/ajs/publications/JudicaturePDFs/
OBrien_893.pdf (last visited July 30, 2006).
"Transcript of Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 4, at 337 ("I do think
there is room for the court to take more cases. They hear about half the number of
cases they did 25 years ago. There may be good reasons for that that I will learn if
I am confirmed, but just looking at it from the outside, I think they could contribute
more to the clarity and uniformity of the law by taking more cases.").
17See Peter Bowman Rutledge & Nicole L. Angarella, An End of Term Exam: October
Term 2003 at the United States Supreme Court, 54 Cath. U.L. Rev. 151, 240 (2004).
1
sRobert L. Stern, et al., Supreme Court Practice 336 (8th ed. 2002).
19Georgetown Overview, supra note 6, at 25.
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about the desirability of increasing the docket. The coming term will
provide additional indications of whether the chief justice is able to
increase the docket.
Apart from his impact in his capacity as first among equals, Chief
Justice Roberts' impact as a voting justice has been relatively straight-
forward. He generally has aligned himself with the views of Justices
Scalia and Thomas on most issues, including executive power, crimi-
nal law, and the Commerce Clause.20 In terms of voting affinity
Chief Justice Roberts voted with Justice Scalia 86.4% of the time,
the second-highest voting affinity after the Scalia-Thomas affinity
(86.8%).21 By contrast, he aligned least frequently with Justice Ste-
vens.' One major exception to this trend came in Padilla v. Hanft.3
In that case, the Court denied certiorari, and Chief Justice Roberts
joined an opinion by Justice Kennedy respecting the denial of certio-
rari.24 In that opinion, also joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy
expressed some concern over how Padilla's transfer could frustrate
habeas review and noted the "fundamental" separation of powers
considerations raised by the case.25 As described below in Part II,
the coming term offers several opportunities to test whether the
voting alliance between Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
Thomas will continue to stick.
B. Justice Alito
The coming term also will provide further insights into the impact
of Justice Alito. Compared to Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito
provides a far more limited data set (he voted in only thirty-six cases
the past term). In those cases, however he voted most frequently with
Chief Justice Roberts. 26 By contrast, he voted with Justice Stevens
20See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006); House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064
(2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
904 (2006).
21Georgetown Overview, supra note 6, at 9. Other studies suggest that the voting
alliance between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia was the highest on the Court.
See Tom Goldstein, The First Voting Statistics, Scotusblog (June 28, 2006), available
at www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/06/the first votin.html.
22Georgetown Overview, supra note 6, at 9.
23See Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006).
24See 126 S. Ct. at 1649-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
251d. at 1650.
26Georgetown Overview, supra note 6, at 9.
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only 41.2% of the term, by far the lowest voting affinity of the Court
of any pair of justices.27 While one should not read too much into
these statistics due to the limited data set, several data points suggest
the emergence of a Roberts-Scalia-Thomas-Alito voting bloc. In the
5-4 cases decided by the Court this past term, those four justices
voted together six times. Another telling indicator came in three
cases reargued after his confirmation. In each, Justice Alito voted
with the Roberts-Scalia-Thomas bloc. 28 As with Chief Justice Roberts,
there are a few, low-level counter-trends. In his first vote following
confirmation, Justice Alito declined to vacate a stay in a capital case
(contrary to the views of Justices Scalia and Thomas).29 Additionally,
he parted company with Justice Scalia in United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez,30 which held that depriving a criminal defendant of the counsel
of his choice represented structural error."' As discussed below in
Part II, the coming term presents several occasions where the Rob-
erts-Alito bloc can have a significant impact on the course of the
Court's jurisprudence.
C. Justice Kennedy
Since he joined the Court in 1988, Justice Kennedy has shared
with Justice O'Connor the power of serving as "swing justice" on
most issues. During her last five terms on the bench, Justice O'Con-
nor was in the majority most often in 5-4 decisions.32 Prior to that,
Justice Kennedy regularly was most often in the majority in such
close cases." When Justice O'Connor announced her retirement,
Court watchers predicted the solidification of Justice Kennedy's posi-
tion as the swing justice.'
27Id.
28See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006); Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct.
2159 (2006); and Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).
29See Rutherford v. Crosby, 126 S. Ct. 1190 (2006).
30126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
"See id. at 2566 (Alito, J., dissenting).
32Rutledge & Angarella, supra note 17, at 157.
331d.
3 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, With Alito, Kennedy would have pivotal role, Boston
Globe, Nov. 4, 2005, at A3; Orin S. Kerr, O'Connor's Successor Will Likely Be a
Swinger, L.A. Times, July 3, 2005, at Ml.
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October Term 2005 largely confirms this prediction and suggests
that Justice Kennedy perhaps even relishes the role a bit." Somewhat
surprisingly, among the justices who sat for the entire term, Justice
Kennedy ranked behind Chief Justice Roberts among justices in the
majority in split decisions (i.e., those decided by five-vote majorit-
ies). 6 But in "high-profile" cases (i.e, those involving major issues
of constitutional law or otherwise expected to spark significant dis-
agreement among members of the Court), he was by far most fre-
quently in the majority and wrote the majority opinion most often."
In several close cases, Justice Kennedy parted from a Roberts-Scalia-
Thomas(-Alito) bloc and provided the critical vote joining a Stevens-
Souter-Ginsburg-Breyer bloc." In others, he wrote separate opin-
ions-either concurring or concurring in the judgment-effectively
providing the governing rule for the case.39 The coming term presents
further opportunities to test whether Justice Kennedy will solidify
his role as the "swing justice" in close cases.
This section has identified some of the major trends at the Court
brought about by the changes in membership that can be expected
to influence the coming term. The next section identifies some of
the critical cases on the Court's docket and analyzes how the chang-
ing voting dynamics at the Court can influence the outcome of
those cases.
II. Key Cases on the Docket
As noted above, the Court currently has twenty-nine cases on its
argument docket for October Term 2006. In this brief essay, it is
impossible to discuss all of them in adequate depth. This part high-
lights some of the more important ones-in areas including punitive
"See, e.g., Drew C. Ensign, Comment, The Impact of Liberty on Stare Decisis: The
Rehnquist Court from Casey to Lawrence, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1137,1165 (2006); Andrew
Cohen, The Kennedy Court: The Real Power Lies With Kennedy's Swing Vote, CBS
News (July 4, 2006), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07/04/opinion/
courtwatch/mainl774288.shtml.
36Georgetown Overview, supra note 6, at 8.
371d.
3
1See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
39See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2170 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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damages, abortion, affirmative action, environmental law and crimi-
nal procedure. It places these cases in the context of the voting
dynamics described above.
A. Punitive Damages
During the confirmation hearings on Justices Roberts and Alito,
various commentators expressed the hope that the Court would
take more "business" cases." In Philip Morris USA v. Williams,"1 the
Supreme Court answers that call and again takes up the constitu-
tional limits on punitive damages awards. Ten years ago, in BMW
of North America v. Gore, the Supreme Court set forth the modern-day
framework for those limits.4 2 Gore required that punitive damages
awards be measured against three "guideposts": the reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct, the proportionality between the punitive
damages award and the harm to the plaintiff, and a comparison of
the punitive damages award to other civil or criminal penalties.'
More recently, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Camp-
bell, the Court further expounded on those limits.' At bottom, the
Court in State Farm held that the reprehensibility guidepost permits,
at most, only a limited consideration of lawful out-of-state conduct
and that a 145:1 ratio between punitive and compensatory damages
was "excessive."5
Williams arises out of a widow's tort suit against the cigarette
manufacturer following her husband's death for lung cancer. After
a trial, a jury awarded the widow approximately $821,000 in compen-
satory damages (subsequently remitted to approximately $521,000)
and $79.5 million in punitive damages. Following extensive appellate
proceedings (including a vacatur and remand by the U.S. Supreme
Court in light of State Farm), the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the
$79.5 million punitive award.4 6
40See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Kenneth W. Starr, In Case You Missed It: The Supreme
Court's Business, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 2005, at A14.
"No. 05-1256.
42517 U.S. 559 (1996).
4 1d. at 574-75.
44538 U.S. 408 (2003).
45Id. at 422, 424-26.
4 6Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (2006) (summarizing history
of the case).
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As it comes to the Supreme Court, Williams presents two basic
issues: (1) the relationship between the various Gore guideposts and
(2) whether the Constitution permits a jury to consider non-party
conduct as it awards punitive damages. The first issue presents the
recurring problem in any legal doctrine that turns on a multi-factor
test: what does one do when the factors cut in different directions?
Here, for example, the proportionality guidepost suggests that the
punitive damages award (more than 150 times the remitted compen-
satory damages) exceeded the constitutional limit (the Supreme
Court previously had suggested that a 4:1 ratio was "close to the
constitutional line.")47 But can such a ratio be justified when the
defendant's conduct is particularly reprehensible under the first Gore
guidepost?
The second issue re-raises an issue that the Court addressed, but
did not squarely resolve, in State Farm. State Farm suggested that a
jury could not, in its award, punish a defendant for conduct that
affects non-parties," but it was unclear whether this limitation
applied to all conduct involving non-parties or only dissimilar con-
duct. The Oregon Supreme Court applied the narrower reading, a
limitation that did not bar consideration of harm suffered by other
smokers due to Philip Morris's alleged conduct.49 If Williams rejected
this interpretation and erected a broader bar, that could have a
profound effect on the admissibility of evidence during the damages
phase of a case.
Apart from the interesting doctrinal questions presented by Wil-
liams, the case also presents an opportunity for Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito to shape the jurisprudence in this area. Here, the
fault lines among the other justices are a bit unconventional. Justices
Scalia and Thomas have repeatedly expressed their view that Gore
was wrongly decided and that the Due Process Clause does not
constrain the size of punitive damages awards." Justice Ginsburg
likewise disagreed with Gore and the Court's post-Gore jurisprudence
"State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. See also Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 23 (1991).
"State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423-24.
49Williams, 127 P.3d at 1175-76.
soSee Gore, 517 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also State Farm, 538 U.S. at
429 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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but on federalism grounds-viewing the Gore doctrine as an unjusti-
fied federal intrusion into matters traditionally committed to the
states.5' By contrast, Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer all
have subscribed to some constitutional limits on the size of punitive
damages awards. This leaves Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
as the swing votes in the case. Neither of them during their time on
the federal appellate bench had an occasion to express a view on
the scope of the doctrine. Thus, if they both joined the Scalia-Thomas-
Ginsburg wing, Williams has the potential to cut back on the limits
articulated in Gore and State Farm. As a case coming from a state
trial court, the case presents a particular opportunity for Justice
Ginsburg to advance her federalism arguments and perhaps, in
doing so, persuade one or two of the new justices.
B. Abortion
Two cases on the docket this year-Gonzales v. Carhart52 and Gonza-
les v. Planned Parenthood53-invite the Court to consider again the
constitutionality of laws restricting abortion, here the federal Partial
Birth Abortion Act." Such issues are not new for the Court. In
Stenberg v. Carhart,7 the Court invalidated a Nebraska law that pro-
hibited one type of late-term abortion known as "dilation and extrac-
tion" (D&X).6 One of the Nebraska statute's flaws, according to the
Stenberg Court, was its failure to include an exception that would
allow D&X where necessary to protect the mother's health. Last term,
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England " presented the
Roberts Court an opportunity to reconsider whether the Constitution
requires abortion regulations to contain a "maternal health" excep-
tion. But the Court in Ayotte clearly declined to "revisit [its] abortion
precedents today," instead resolving the case on a narrower
ground-namely that the lower court had crafted too broad a rem-
edy by invalidating the entire statute.5 8
"Gore, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
52No. 05-380
"No. 05-1382.
"Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006)).
55530 U.S. 914 (2000).
6Id. at 950-51.
57126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
"Id. at 964-65.
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The two cases currently on the Court's abortion docket likely will
resurrect the debate in Stenberg and Ayotte over the constitutional
requirement for a maternal health exception. The federal law,
enacted in response to Stenberg, prohibits two types of late-term
abortions-D&X and dilation and evacuation (D&E). While the fed-
eral act, like the Nebraska act, does not include a maternal health
exception, the statute includes specific findings that attempt to justify
this decision." The Nebraska statute lacked such findings. Notwith-
standing the differences, federal appellate courts in both cases, the
Eighth Circuit in Gonzales v. Carhart60 and the Ninth Circuit in Gonza-
les v. Planned Parenthood,' invalidated the federal statutes. In his
petitions for writs of certiorari, the solicitor general framed the ques-
tion in terms of whether the federal law was unconstitutional due
to its failure to include a maternal health exception.
The Court's treatment of the two petitions is noteworthy. In Gonza-
les v. Carhart, the Court held the petition pending its decision in
Ayotte, rejecting the solicitor general's suggestion that the Court
grant the petition. Instead, the Court granted the petition after decid-
ing Ayotte. Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood, the Court
again rejected the solicitor general's suggestion about how to treat
the petition. Here, the solicitor general suggested that the Court
hold the petition until it had resolved Gonzales v. Carhart. Contrary
to that suggestion, the Court this time granted the petition.
What explains the Court's treatment of these petitions and
repeated rejections of the solicitor general's suggestions? As to its
decision to hold Gonzales v. Carhart for Ayotte, rather than grant
it, two are possible. First, as already noted, Ayotte presented an
opportunity for the Court to display rare consensus on an abortion
case (perhaps illustrative of Chief Justice Roberts's philosophy of
judicial minimalism); in light of the 5-4 decision in Stenberg, such
consensus would have been impossible if the Court had also consid-
ered Gonzales v. Carhart. Second, deferral on Gonzales v. Carhart means
that Justice Alito, rather than Justice O'Connor, will address the
major question whether the Constitution requires a maternal health
59Pub. L. No. 108-105, supra note 54, at § 2.
60Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005).
61Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th
Cir. 2006).
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exception. This is potentially quite significant, for Justice O'Connor
joined the majority in Stenberg whereas Justice Kennedy dissented.
This means that, if Justice Alito (and Chief Justice Roberts) joined
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, potentially five votes exist to
uphold the federal statute. This would depend, as well, on whether
Justice Kennedy remains committed to his views expressed in Sten-
berg or, instead, follows Stenberg in reliance on stare decisis. Thus,
this case presents one of the starkest examples where the new voting
dynamics of the Roberts Court will shape the doctrine.
What about the Court's decision to grant the petition in Gonzales
v. Planned Parenthood rather than hold it? This is particularly curious:
both petitions presented precisely the same question, and the Court's
order granting certiorari did not reframe the question or order the
parties to address additional issues. Nonetheless, again, two expla-
nations are possible. One is that the Court saw Gonzales v. Planned
Parenthood as an opportunity to address additional constitutional
challenges to the federal law. These include whether the federal law
imposed an "undue burden" on a woman's decision whether to
have an abortion and whether the law was void for vagueness. This
reason is at least a bit dubitable, for the solicitor general expressly
conceded that the respondents in Gonzales v. Carhart properly pre-
served these issues below and, thus, the Court could consider them
in that case.62 Another, more likely, reason why the Court may have
granted the petition in Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood is to consider
again the remedial questions at issue in Ayotte. The Ninth Circuit's
decision contained a richer discussion of whether, in light of Ayotte,
to invalidate the federal law in its entirety.63 By contrast, the Eighth
Circuit decided Gonzales v. Carhart before the Supreme Court decided
Ayotte and, thus, naturally lacks consideration of this more recent
jurisprudence.
Of course, we will only know the answer to this question after
the Court hands down its opinion in Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood,
but the opinion (particularly its author) will be quite revealing. In
particular, if Chief Justice Roberts is in the majority, it may well
reveal something about his use of the opinion-assignment power.
62Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc. (No. 05-1382).
63435 F.3d at 1184-91.
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If he assigns the opinions to a justice who would like to expressly
overrule Roe and Casey (like he did in Hudson in the context of the
exclusionary rule), these decisions might contain broad language
presaging a broader shift in the Court's abortion jurisprudence. By
contrast, if he assigns the opinion to a justice with more moderate
(perhaps minimalist) views, then the opinion likely will lack such
broad language and signal the Court's reluctance to reconsider its
past abortion decisions.
C. Affirmative Action
Two cases this term-Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education
("Meredith")" and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District #1 ("Parents Involved")5 -present the Court with an
opportunity to consider the constitutionality of programs that use
race to determine a student's assignment to a public high school.
The Court most recently addressed related issues two terms ago in
Gratz v. Bollinger,6 which involved the University of Michigan's
undergraduate admissions system, and Grutter v. Bollinger," which
involved the University's law school admissions system. Those
decisions were criticized for sending conflicting signals over the
constitutional contours of affirmative action programs." In some
respects, that criticism was unfair. Both decisions shared certain
common conclusions. In those cases the Court held: (1) that affirma-
tive action admissions programs constituted race-based classifica-
tions subject to strict scrutiny, and (2) that diversity (at least in the
context of higher education) was a "compelling state interest" that
could justify a race-based classification.6' In other respects, though,
the criticism was justified. The decisions parted company on a core
issue-namely whether the admissions programs were "narrowly
tailored" to advance the state's interest. While the two admissions
programs differed in certain respects (such as how race factored into
the admissions process), these distinctions surely were slender reeds
'No. 05-915
65No. 05-908.
66Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
67Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
"See, e.g., Rachel F. Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative
Action in Higher Education, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 201, 202 (2006).
69Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
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on which to distinguish the cases and particularly difficult to justify
as a matter of constitutional principle. The different results in Gratz
and Grutter came under harsh criticism as examples of the Court's
confusing, patchwork jurisprudence that failed to provide clear guid-
ance to lower courts and policymakers 0 In a passage that has been
the subject of much criticism, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Grutter announced famously that "[w]e expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today."" As Justice O'Connor provided
the swing vote in the two cases, there was a plausible argument that
the outcomes seemed to turn on little more than Justice O'Connor's
personal policy preferences.
Enter, then, Meredith and Parents Involved. Meredith concerns a
challenge to Jefferson County, Kentucky's school assignment system.
Under that system, which has existed in some form since a 1975
desegregation order, students can indicate their preferred school,
but the school district assigns them based on a formula that ensures
that the African American student population at each school is
between 15% and 50%.' While the school district maintains that
most students receive one of their top-two choices, some parents
complain that the assignment system has not worked-it imposes
educational disadvantages on their children and creates logistical
problems for students who in some cases must travel several hours
per day to and from school. Parents Involved concerns a challenge
to the Seattle School District's program for assigning students to
high schools; under that system, the school district considers race
as one of several factors in assigning students to schools, particularly
where the school district deems the school to be "racially imbal-
anced."73 Under that system, the school district had excluded quali-
fied white applicants who otherwise satisfied the admissions criteria
for special "magnet" or other high-achieving schools.
70See Suzanne B. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs: Where Do Universi-
ties Go From Gratz and Grutter?, 33 J.L. & Educ. 21, 21 (2004), available at http://
www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3994/is_200401/ain9383333. See also
David Faigman, Laboratory of Justice: The Supreme Court's 200-Year Struggle to
Integrate Science and the Law (2004).
7 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
72McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools, 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (W.D.
Ky. 2004)
'Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d
1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005). Specifically, under the program, the school district first
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These cases present the first opportunity for the Court, following
Justice O'Connor's retirement, to address not only the scope of Gratz
and Grutter but also the continued viability of Grutter. Both cases
present common themes: (1) whether Gratz's holding that diversity
is a compelling state interest extends to admissions preferences in
secondary school assignments/admissions, and (2) how to apply
the narrow tailoring requirement after Gratz and Grutter. Unlike the
abortion cases, though, these twin cases present distinct questions
that explain more clearly why the Court granted both petitions. Most
centrally, the petition in Meredith could be read to ask the Court to
overrule Grutter and Gratz.'
Apart from the interesting doctrinal questions, these cases also
will provide important evidence on the shifting vote dynamics on
the Court. As in the abortion cases, in Gratz and Grutter Justice
Kennedy aligned himself with Justices Thomas and Scalia. Conse-
quently, if Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito share this view, a
majority of the Court would exist to cabin or, even, overrule Grutter.
Even more than the abortion cases, Meredith and Parents Involved
present one of the first opportunities for Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito to signal their views on matters of stare decisis. Like
the abortion cases, Meredith and Parents Involved present another test
of how Justice Kennedy might position himself as the swing vote-
will he hew to his views in Gratz and Grutter or, instead, back away
from them, either through factual distinctions between the cases
or in reliance on stare decisis? Finally, as with the abortion cases,
assuming Chief Justice Roberts is in the majority, these cases will
provide an important insight into his use of the opinion-assignment
power-whether to assign the opinions to justices likely to signal
broad shifts in the Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence or, instead,
to minimalists less inclined to overrule prior precedent.
D. Environmental Law
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency' presents one of
those classic cases where popular discussions of the issues mask
considers whether the student has a sibling in the school; it then considers race;
thereafter, it considers accessibility to the student's home; finally it utilizes ran-
dom assignment.
'Meredith also presents the question whether the district court exceeded its remedial
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some of the subtle underlying questions of legal doctrine. Popularly,
the case is understood as the "greenhouse gas case,""6 the product of
a multi-year effort (stretching back before the change in presidential
administrations) by a coalition of states, cities, environmental
groups, and others ("the environmental petitioners") to force the
Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gases.
Legally, the case involves complex issues of standing, statutory inter-
pretation, and administrative law.
Back in 1999, the environmental petitioners asked the EPA to
regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases under section
201(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act. Section 201(a)(1) directs the EPA
administrator to "prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission
of any air pollutant from [cars] which, in his judgment, cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare."" During the notice-and-
comment period on the petition, the National Research Council, an
arm of the National Academy of Sciences, issued a report concluding
that "causal linkage" between greenhouse gases and global warming
"cannot be unequivocally established."" Following this report, the
EPA concluded that the input received during the notice and com-
ment period did not seriously alter the National Research Council's
conclusions. Legally, then, the EPA could not conclude that green-
house gases "cause, or contribute to, air pollution."
The environmental petitioners then sought review of the EPA's
decision in the D.C. Circuit. In a badly divided panel opinion, the
court dismissed the petitions. Two judges (Randolph and Tatel)
believed that the Court should reach the merits-Judge Randolph
made the unusual assumption that the plaintiffs had established
standing (at least to survive summary judgment), whereas Judge
Tatel concluded definitely that at least one plaintiff had standing.79
A different pair of judges (Randolph and Sentelle) agreed that the
EPA acted reasonably in its decision not to regulate (Judge Sentelle,
'See, e.g., Warren Richey, High court to hear 'greenhouse' case, Christian Science
Monitor, June 27, 2006, at 10.
7742 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
7 Committee on the Science of Climate Change, National Research Council, Climate
Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions 17 (2001).
'See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50,56 (D.C. Cir. 2005); id. at 64-67 (Tatel,
J., dissenting).
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unlike Randolph and Tatel, concluded that the plaintiffs did not
establish standing)."
As it comes to the Supreme Court, the case is curious in several
respects. Here, as in the abortion cases, the Court bucked the recom-
mendation of the solicitor general, who had recommended denying
certiorari. More notably, the case turns traditional federalism princi-
ples on its head. Whereas most federalism debates involve state
governments objecting to federal encroachment, here some states
are affirmatively asking the federal government to regulate a matter
(admittedly, though, other states oppose the requested involve-
ment). Finally, to add to the comedy, the responsible federal agency,
in an exceptional example of bureaucratic self-restraint, is taking
the view that it lacks the authority to provide the sought-after
regulation.'
Apart from these curiosities, the case presents several interesting
doctrinal issues. Some concern standing. There is some doubt
whether any of the environmental petitioners can satisfy the injury
and redressability requirements set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife.82 While the environmental petitioners submitted extensive
documentation on the health and environmental impacts of green-
house gases, at bottom their complaint bears the hallmarks of the
types of generalized grievances that standing doctrine does not toler-
ate (interestingly, Judge Tatel, who dissented in the D.C. Circuit
panel opinion, concluded that a state, the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, had standing).83 A determination by the Supreme Court
that any of the environmental petitioners had standing in this case
might mark an important new boundary to Lufan's sometimes strict
standing requirements.
The case also presents an interesting question about how a court
should address standing questions that are intimately intertwined
with the merits. A few terms ago, the Court in Steel Co. v. Citizens
"Id. at 56-59 (Randolph, J.); id. at 60-61 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part).
"Notably, in the course of the administrative proceedings in 2003, the EPA general
counsel withdrew a memorandum, drafted by his predecessor under President Clin-
ton, that had concluded that the Clean Air Act did authorize the EPA to regulate
climate change. Id. at 54.
82504 U.S. 555 (1992).
415 F.3d at 67 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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for a Better Environment" chided lower federal courts for eliding
difficult standing questions and, instead, assuming standing in order
to dispose of the case on more straightforward merits-related rea-
sons.' The decision created both frustration and confusion among
lower federal courts as they sought to sort out the order in which
they had to decide jurisdictional and merits issues in a case." Recog-
nizing the tensions that this case presents with Steel Company, Judge
Randolph took the exceptional step of relying on the D.C. Circuit's
statutory standing cases. He concluded that, notwithstanding doubts
about any environmental petitioner's standing, the petitioners had,
in his opinion, put forth enough information to defeat summary
judgment motion on standing, thereby justifying a decision on the
merits." Watch to see whether the Court uses this case as an opportu-
nity further to gloss Steel Company's order of inquiry.
Finally, the case presents another foray by the Court into the scope
of the nation's major environmental laws. Court-watchers will recall
that, last term, a badly divided Court in Rapanos v. United States"
addressed the scope of the Clean Water Act, with the justices dis-
agreeing over the precise "nexus" that a particular waterway or
wetland had to have in order to qualify for regulation under the
act. Here, Justice Kennedy provided the swing vote, concurring in
the plurality's judgment but articulating reasoning that, in some
respects, aligned him more closely with the dissent." If the Court
reaches the merits, one can expect another pitched battle, with Justice
Kennedy likely in the middle, over the scope of the Clean Air Act.
E. Criminal Procedure
The Court's docket consistently has included a large number of
criminal cases, and October Term 2006 is no exception." Three in
84523 U.S. 83 (1998).
"Id. at 93-101.
"See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (addressing confu-
sion in the Fifth Circuit over application of Steel Co.).
87415 F.3d at 55-56.
8 See supra note 10.
89See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
90See Ornaski v. Belmontes, 414 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct.
1909 (2006) (No. 05-493); Toledo-Flores v. United States, 149 Fed. Appx. 241 (8th Cir.
2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1652 (2006) (No. 05-7664); Whorton v. Bockting, 399
F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2017 (2006) (No. 05-595); Carey v.
Musladin, 427 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1769 (2006) (No. 05-
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particular warrant brief mention here-Cunningham v. California,"
Burton v. Waddington,2 and Whorton v. Bockting." Cunningham and
Burton both involve the Sixth Amendment jury right as detailed in
the Supreme Court's earlier decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey94 and
Blakely v. Washington." Apprendi held that the Sixth Amendment jury
guarantee requires that a jury, not a judge, find any fact (apart
from recidivism) that increases the statutory maximum penalty for
a crime.6 Blakely extended this holding to invalidate Washington's
state sentencing scheme, under which judicial fact-finding could
increase a defendant's sentence within a presumptive range that
was within the statutory maximum." (Blakely was the critical case
in the doctrinal developments that resulted in the Supreme Court's
decisions in Booker and Fanfan that invalidated mandatory applica-
tion of the United States Sentencing Guidelines)."
Cunningham involves a challenge under the Apprendi-Blakely line
of cases to California's Determinate Sentencing Law.99 Under that
law, generally, a convicted defendant is sentenced to one of several
"terms" (upper, middle, or lower), all of which are within the statu-
tory maximum penalty. California's law instructs that the judge
"shall" select the middle term unless he finds, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that aggravating circumstances warrant imposition
of the "upper" term (or mitigating circumstances justify imposition
of the "lower" term). In this case, following Cunningham's convic-
tion for continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14, the
785); United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 425 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126
S. Ct. 1776 (2006) (No. 05-998); People v. Cunningham, No. A103501, 2005 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 3383 (Cal. App. 1st April 18, 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1329 (2006)
(No. 05-6551); Burton v. Waddington, 142 Fed. Appx. 297 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2352 (2006) (No. 05-9222); and James v. United States, 172 Fed. Appx. 144





-530 U.S. 466 (2000).
95542 U.S. 296 (2004).
96See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
97See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304-05.
9 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
99Cal. Penal Code § 1120.
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trial judge determined that various "aggravating factors" justified
sentencing Cunningham to the "upper term" of 16 years (rather
than the "middle term" of 12 years).100 At issue before the Supreme
Court is whether this four-year upward enhancement under the
Determinate Sentencing Law contravenes the Blakely doctrine.
While both sides have plausible arguments, Cunningham's is
probably stronger as a matter of doctrine. His argument is straight-
forward-that under the Determinate Sentencing Law the defendant
is subject to an increased punishment based on judicial fact-finding.
Blakely, however, forbids this practice and, instead, requires the jury
to find any facts (apart from the fact of a prior conviction) that
increase the sentence, even when that sentence is within the statutory
maximum. California advances two main arguments in response.
First, it argues that, unlike the scheme in Blakely, California's law
(as authoritatively interpreted by its supreme court) permits, but
does not require, the judge to enhance the sentence.' 0 ' Through this
argument, California tries to align its sentencing scheme with the
residual federal guidelines scheme following Booker (where judges
are not obligated to apply the guidelines but, apparently, must con-
sult them in an effort to impose a reasonable sentence within the
statutory maximum). Second, California also argues that sentences
in its scheme are "based on the verdict" whereas in Blakely the
sentencing judge could not depart from the presumptive range with-
out additional factfinding.
Whatever the outcome, the case potentially has important doc-
trinal consequences. If the Supreme Court strikes down the Califor-
nia sentencing law, such an anti-federalist broadening of the Blakely
principle would call into doubt several other states' determinate
sentencing schemes.10 2 If the Supreme Court upholds the California
scheme, that decision would supply a bookend to the Apprendi-
Blakely doctrine. It also would provide Congress a model of how to
bring the federal guidelines into compliance with the Sixth
Amendment.
"People v. Cunningham, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3383, at *2, *20, *30-31
(Cal. App. 1st April 18, 2005) (describing facts and California sentencing scheme).
101See People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534, 543 (Cal. 2005).
102See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 656 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Lopez, 123
P.3d 754, 768 (N.M. 2005).
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Burton involves the broader question whether Blakely applies retro-
actively. Generally, under the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence,
new procedural rules do not apply to convictions that were final at
the time the Court announced the decision (a final conviction is one
where the Court has denied certiorari on direct review or the time
for filing a certiorari petition on direct review has expired)."o' The
Court first asks whether the rule was "new" (that is, was it "dictated
by prior precedent"). If the rule is not new, then it can apply retroac-
tively. If the rule is new, then it generally will not apply retroactively
unless the case falls under one of two exceptions: (1) it constitutes
a watershed rule of criminal procedure or (2) the rule places certain
conduct beyond criminal sanction.104
In this case, Burton was convicted in a Washington state court of
rape, robbery, and murder. Burton was sentenced to forty-seven
years imprisonment, twenty-one years higher than the ordinary sen-
tence under Washington's guidelines in effect at the time. Those
guidelines, however, permitted the trial judge to make an upward
adjustment, and the trial judge did so in this case." After Burton's
conviction became final, the Supreme Court invalidated the Wash-
ington scheme in Blakely. Thus, unless Blakely applied retroactively,
Burton could not benefit from the decision (he could, however,
benefit from Apprendi, which was decided before his conviction
became final). Doctrinally, therefore, the questions are whether (1)
Blakely is new (or, instead was "dictated" by Apprendi) and, if Blakely
is new, whether (2) it announced a watershed rule of criminal
procedure?
Here, the decision to grant certiorari is curious in light of the
Court's recent retroactivity jurisprudence. In recent years, the Court
generally only has granted certiorari in non-capital habeas corpus
cases either where there is a deep split among the federal courts of
appeals over a question of habeas corpus law or where the state is
seeking review of an adverse judgment. In this case, the petition
effectively conceded the unanimity among federal appellate courts
0 See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 301 (1989).
"See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351-52. In dicta, Schriro arguably modified this second
exception-characterizing it as a type of "substantive" rule rather than an exception
to the general prohibition against retroactive application of new procedural rules.
Id. at 352 n.4.
10 Burton v. Waddington, 142 Fed. Appx. 297, 299-300 (9th Cir. 2005).
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that Blakely was not retroactive and could identify only a weak
split at best with two state appellate decisions.'06 While it is always
difficult to read the tea leaves in a decision to grant certiorari, the
Court's order suggests that (a) it saw the case as an opportunity to
fill the docket, (b) the case provided a good vehicle to resolve an
issue that the Court eventually would have to settle, or (c) some
justices genuinely believed that the lower courts were misreading
its cues about Blakely's retroactivity.
Some language in the Court's prior decisions suggests that it did
in fact believe that Apprendi dictated Blakely and, thus, Blakely was
not a new rule. For example, the Court in Blakely described the
case as requiring it "to apply the rule we expressed in Apprendi."107
Likewise, according to the Court, Apprendi reflected "longstanding
tenets of common-law criminal jurisprudence."'o These principles
were moreover "acknowledged by courts and treatises since the
earliest days of graduated sentencing."o'0 The Court might stitch
together each of these doctrinal threads to support a holding that
Blakely was not a "new" rule and, thus, could apply to the issue
in Burton.
Even more than Cunningham, the consequences of Burton could
be enormous. Affirmance would work little mischief, as it would
merely validate the unanimous views of the lower federal courts.
Reversal, however, would reopen potentially thousands of sentences
entered under schemes created prior to the Supreme Court's rule
in Blakely. The federalism and finality costs of such a decision, in
terms of reopened convictions, could be potentially staggering: it
would all but ensure a flood of new habeas corpus petitions in
"The petition cited a decision from the Tennessee Supreme Court and the Colorado
Court of Appeals. See Petition for Certiorari at 7-8, Burton v. Waddington (No. 05-
9222) (citing State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Johnson, 121 P.3d
285 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005)). The first decision involved a direct appeal and, therefore,
at best only provides dictum on the retroactivity issue. The second, presently under
review by the Colorado Supreme Court, does conflict with the unanimous view of
the federal appellate courts but does not satisfy the standards for certiorari set forth
in Supreme Court Rule 10.
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state and federal courts, seeking to reopen sentences entered in
contravention of Blakely.
Like Burton, Bockting involves the retroactivity of a recent constitu-
tional decision that finds its genesis in an unusual alignment of
justices. Court-watchers will recall that in Crawford v. Washington..o
the Supreme Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts and held that, subject
to a few historically rooted exceptions, the Confrontation Clause
prohibits the introduction of a witness's out-of-court testimonial
statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has
had a prior opportunity to cross examine the witness."' That decision
had its genesis in views originating with Justice Thomas and strongly
resisted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice
Kennedy.112
In this case, Bockting was on trial for sexual abuse charges. The
critical pieces of evidence admitted against him were the child-
victim's statements to a detective.113 Under Crawford, such evidence
would be inadmissible, but Bockting's conviction became final before
the Supreme Court handed down Crawford. Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit held that Crawford applied retroactively. In its retroactivity
analysis, the Ninth Circuit conceded that Crawford announced a new
rule (undoubtedly right in light of Crawford's overruling of prior
precedent).114 Nonetheless, it concluded that Crawford announced a
"watershed rule of criminal procedure" and, thus, applied to convic-
tions that were final at the time the Supreme Court decided the
case."'s Unlike Burton, there is little mystery surrounding why the
Supreme Court took this case. The Ninth Circuit's holding on the
"watershed" point created a clear conflict among the federal appel-
late courts."'
Doctrinally, the case will provide the Court another opportunity
to gloss the meaning of the exceptions under which new procedural
110541 U.S. 36 (2004).
"Id. at 67-68.
112See the opinions in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), and Justice Thomas's
separate opinion in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).




6Compare Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding
Crawford is not a watershed decision).
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rules can apply retroactively. In its recent decision of Schriro v.
Summerlin," a bare majority of the Court held that Ring v. Arizona
did not apply retroactively and, in doing so, narrowly defined the
"watershed rule" exception."' Schriro held that such a rule must
be one "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
seriously diminished."119 The four Schriro dissenters (Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer) may see Bockting as an opportunity to push back
on Schriro. Yet they may find it difficult to pick up a fifth vote here.
Justice Kennedy joined the Schriro majority. While two members
of the Schriro majority (Justices Scalia and Thomas) were among
Crawford's staunchest advocates, 20 they also supported Ring yet did
not find it retroactive. Schriro, thus, demonstrates that these two
justices are reluctant to apply new constitutional rules retroactively
even where they may support the underlying rule. That leaves only
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, neither of whom has indicated
a strong preference for a robust retroactivity jurisprudence.
Conclusion
October Term 2006 already promises to provide important indica-
tors of the future direction of the Court. Some of the complex cases
described above, especially Massachusetts v. EPA, will test the chief
justice's ability to achieve consensus. Others such as the abortion
and affirmative action cases may reveal how he will use the opinion-
assignment power (when in the majority) to shape the doctrine.
Williams will provide important insights into the impact of Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in an area of the doctrine important
to business interests. And everyone will be watching whether Justice
Kennedy continues to position himself in the middle of these close
cases as he did last year. With a relatively small docket to date and
with cases such as the constitutionality of the search of Congressman
Jefferson's office and the terrorist surveillance program looming on
the horizon, no doubt more cases testing these dynamics will fill
the docket in the months to come.
117See supra note 103.
11Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004). In Ring, the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment precluded imposition of the death penalty based on judicial fact
finding. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 484, 609 (2002).
119See Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352.
1
20See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993);
and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
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